There you have it! Someone is walking around with stolen logins for 4,837 GitHub accounts, and re…
November 12, 2026 · 0 likes · 0 comments
AI Cybersecurity
There you have it! Someone is walking around with stolen logins for 4,837 GitHub accounts, and researchers say they used them to run a secret stealer in at least 1,806 repositories since Tuesday.
Full story, just the facts:
https://lnkd.in/eyqKq7np
Aikido Security calls it "wfx-loot." The attacker opens a harmless-looking pull request, "docs: dependency audit notes," to test write access. Aikido counted 61,839 of those across 61,764 repositories in about a day.
Then the payload goes in. It grabs GitHub Actions secrets, the workflow token, cloud credentials for AWS, Azure and Google Cloud, plus keys for OpenAI, Anthropic and Hugging Face. Then it reverts the change within a minute and deletes the run logs. Per Aikido, a missing run number is often the only trace.
That is the part that should scare every CTO in America.
A clean-looking repo proves nothing.
SafeDep, another supply chain firm, counted 8,093 public repositories that received malicious commits. Some carried an npm postinstall hook that also runs on a developer's laptop. Both firms sell security products, and both say the real numbers are higher.
And rotating your secrets may not be enough. Aikido says the script can swap GitHub OIDC tokens for cloud sessions, modify AWS trust policies and insert Azure federated identity credentials. That is access that survives your cleanup.
How did the attacker get 4,837 logins in the first place? Nobody has explained it yet. The Hacker News found new probe pull requests still opening this morning.
I have said it for years. Your CI/CD pipeline is the crown jewel. It holds the keys to production, the cloud and now your AI agents. Yet most companies protect it with a password and a prayer.
If you opened one of those test pull requests, researchers say treat the account as compromised, even if the stealer never ran. Revoke tokens, OAuth grants, SSH keys and sessions. Rotate every secret the repo can reach. Check Azure for unexpected federated credentials, AWS for open trust policies, and your workflow history for gaps.
My advice beyond that: phishing-resistant MFA with hardware keys, short-lived least-privilege tokens instead of long-lived secrets, and a hard look at every workflow and third-party action you run. And patch in days, not quarters.
Time to wake up!
Full story, just the facts:
https://lnkd.in/eyqKq7np
Aikido Security calls it "wfx-loot." The attacker opens a harmless-looking pull request, "docs: dependency audit notes," to test write access. Aikido counted 61,839 of those across 61,764 repositories in about a day.
Then the payload goes in. It grabs GitHub Actions secrets, the workflow token, cloud credentials for AWS, Azure and Google Cloud, plus keys for OpenAI, Anthropic and Hugging Face. Then it reverts the change within a minute and deletes the run logs. Per Aikido, a missing run number is often the only trace.
That is the part that should scare every CTO in America.
A clean-looking repo proves nothing.
SafeDep, another supply chain firm, counted 8,093 public repositories that received malicious commits. Some carried an npm postinstall hook that also runs on a developer's laptop. Both firms sell security products, and both say the real numbers are higher.
And rotating your secrets may not be enough. Aikido says the script can swap GitHub OIDC tokens for cloud sessions, modify AWS trust policies and insert Azure federated identity credentials. That is access that survives your cleanup.
How did the attacker get 4,837 logins in the first place? Nobody has explained it yet. The Hacker News found new probe pull requests still opening this morning.
I have said it for years. Your CI/CD pipeline is the crown jewel. It holds the keys to production, the cloud and now your AI agents. Yet most companies protect it with a password and a prayer.
If you opened one of those test pull requests, researchers say treat the account as compromised, even if the stealer never ran. Revoke tokens, OAuth grants, SSH keys and sessions. Rotate every secret the repo can reach. Check Azure for unexpected federated credentials, AWS for open trust policies, and your workflow history for gaps.
My advice beyond that: phishing-resistant MFA with hardware keys, short-lived least-privilege tokens instead of long-lived secrets, and a hard look at every workflow and third-party action you run. And patch in days, not quarters.
Time to wake up!